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Trends in Ratios of Fixed and Working
Capital to Output
AGGREGATE capital data can also be broken down by type of asset. For
some of the benchmark years, data are separately available for fixed
capital (land, buildings, and equipment) and for working capital (cash,
notes and accounts receivable, inventories, and miscellaneous assets).
For these years, we can relate each component in 1929 prices to output
in 1929 prices.
Manufacturing, 1890—1948
The subdivision between fixed and wordng capital can be made for
seven benchmark years (Table 20). Aside from 1904 (1904 is a year of
TABLE20
Ratios of Fixed and Working Capital to Output:
All Manufacturing, Selected Years, 1890-1953
(basedonvalues in 1929 prices)
Benchmark
Tears
Ratio to Outpvi of—








Source: Based on data in Appendix 1'ab1es A-8, A-9, A-b, and A-15.
business contraction; this tends to raise capital-output ratios), for all
manufacturing, the ratios of both fixed and working capital to output
have risen, presumably to 1919 and most certainly not beyond 1929.
This has been followed by a downward movement in both ratios that
seems to have continued to 1948.
The percentage rise from 1890 to 1929 was somewhat sharper for
the working capital-output ratio than for the fixed capital-output ratio
(23 and 19, respectively). This may be due, in whole or in part, to
reporting-errors in the earlier years when the capital data were derived
from census sources. The census authorities believed that the break-
down of total capital by type of asset was reported with large errors.
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For this reason, they discontinued the inquiry after 1904. Too much
may have been reported as fixed capital and too little as working
capital. Even so, only the rate, not the fact, of an upward trend can be
questioned.
Beginning with 1929 we are on firmer statistical ground. The down-
ward drift of both ratios between 1929 and 1948 is unmistakable—a
34 per cent drop in the fixed capital-output ratio and a 28 per cent
fall in the working capital-output ratio. This is conclusive evidence
that the decline in the total capital-output ratio between 1929 and
TABLE 21
Ratios of Fixed and Working Capital to Output: by Minor Manufacturing
Industries, 1929, 1937, and 1948
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Per cent
Change
Ratio to Output of Capital as SpecifIed: 1929 1937 1948 1929—1948
All manufacturing
.452 .395 .324 —28.3 Working
.433 .346 .285 —34.2 Fixed
Food and kindred products
.294 .233 —30.9 Working
.302 .206 .167 —44.7 Fixed
Bakery and confectionery
.322 .274 .156 —51.6 Working
.458 .344 .212 —53.7 Fixed
Canned products
.590 .450 .333 —43.6 Working
377 .226 .241 —36.1 Fixed
Flour mill products
.183 .249 .170 —7.1 Working
.144 .160 .123 —14.6 Fixed
Packing house products
.158 .149 .130 —17.7 Working
.119 .097 .082 —31.1 Fixed
Sugar refining
.567 .501 .296 —47.8 Working
.885 .526 .367 —58.5 Fixed
Liquors and beverages
.772 .337 .303 —60.8 Working
.707 .275 .268 —62.1 Fixed
Other food products
.305 .284 .184 —39.7 Working
.476 .257 .205 —56.9 Fixed
Tobacco products
.665 .513 —40.4 Working
.106 .072 .056 —47.2 Fixed
(continued)




Ratio to Output of Capital as Specsjied: 1929 1937 1948 1929—1948
Textiles and their products
Working .461 .341 .306 —33.6
Fixed .317 .207 .162 —48.9
Basic textiles
Working .504 .352 .374 —25.8
Fixed .461 .283 .221 —52.1
Carpets and floor coverings
Working .606 .725 .319 —47.4
Fixed .602 .474 .292 —51.5
Knit goods
Working .481 .301 .220 —54.3
Fixed .373 .206 .170 —54.4
Clothing
Working .395 .339 .288 —27.1
Fixed .090 .062 .051 —43.3
Leather and products
Working .518 .416 .314 —39.4
Fixed .176 .119 .093 —47.2
Boots and shoes
Working .466 .408 .330 —29.2
Fixed .154 .112 .084 —45.5
Other leather products
Working .604 .436 .300 —50.3
Fixed .213 .132 .111 —47.9
Rubberproducts
Working .586 .503 .343 —41.5
Fixed .440 .246 .175 —60.2
Tires and tubes
Working .631 .588 .345 —45.3
Fixed .468 .216 .147 —68.6
Other rubber products
Working .490 .382 .370 —24.5
Fixed .395 .372 .266 —32.7
Forest products
Working .612 .449 .311 —49.2
Fixed .760 .614 .394 —48.2
Sawmill and planing
Working .712 .500 .423 —40.6
Fixed 1.074 .949 .761 —29.1
Other wood products
Working .498 .401 .248 —50.2
Fixed .404 .310 .172 —57.4
Paper, pulp, and products
Working .507 .460 .293 —42.2
Fixed .764 .664 .471 —38.4
(continued)




Ratio to Output of Capital as Specified: 1929 1937 1918 1929—1918
Printing, publishing, and allied industries
Working .543 .572 .386 —28.9
Fixed .334 .301 .305 —8.7
Petroleum refining
Working .438 .379 .317 —27.6
Fixed .848 .678 :.576 —32.1
Chemicals and allied substances
Working .588 .455 .351 —40.3
Fixed .404 .352 .365 —9.7
Fertilizers
Working .782 .453 .259 —66.9
Fixed .588 .385 .252 —57.1
Chemicals proper
Working .583 .489 .246 —57.8
Fixed .739 .634 .453 —38.7
Allied chemical substances
Working .600 .468 .388 —35.3
Fixed .321 .274 .323 +0.6
Stone, clay, and glass
Working .548 .455 .336 —38.7
Fixed 1.018 .763 .401 —60.6
Iron and steel products
Working .343 .426 .325 —5.2
Fixed .506 .587 .372 —26.5
Blast furnaces and rolling mills
Working .225 .402 .290 + 28.9
Fixed .619 .738 .368 —40.5
Metal building materials and supplies
Working .519 .463 .432 —16.8
Fixed .362 .354 .202 —44.2
Hardware, tools, etc.
Working .580 .487 .404 —30.3
Fixed .487 .359 .309 —36.6
Nonferrous metals
Working .402 .397 .354 —11.9
Fixed .382 .319 .331 —13.4
Precious metal products and processes
Working .605 .602 .437 —27.8
Fixed .214 .212 .130 —39.3
Other nonferrous metal products and
processes
Working .373 .384 .323 —13.4
Fixed .420 .342 .311 —26.0
(continued)
































Source: Based on data in Appendix Tables 1-8 to A-b.
1948 was notcaused by any change in the relative importance of fixed
and working capital. Moreover, any full explanation of the factors that
have made capital more efficient must relate to working capital as well
as to fixed capital.
How pervasive has the downward movement been in these ratios?
Ratios can be computed for 39 minor industry groups for the bench-
mark years 1929, 1937, and 1948 (Table 21). In only 2 industries (allied
chemical substances, and office and store machinery and equipment)
did the fixed capital-output ratio fail to decline between 1929 and
1948. Among the other 37 industries, the decline exceeds 25 per cent
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.361 .288 .226 —37.4
.619 .444 .397 —35.9
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ratio is similar. In only 3 industries (blast furnaces and rolling mills,
motor vehicles, and aircraft) were the ratios higher in 1948 than in
1929, and in only 5 of the industries with declining ratios was the
relative drop less than 20 per cent. The downward trend in the ratio
of these two components of capital to output was widespread, and the
results for aggregate manufacturing would not have been significantly
affected by any shift in the relative importance of. the various industries.
It does not necessarily follow that all components of the working
capital-output ratio followed the same downward course. In fact, the
deflated ratio of inventories to output (based on a sample of large
corporations) seems to have risen from 1919 to 1929 and again from
1929 to 1937 (Table 22). This ratio declined only between 1937 and
TABLE 22
Ratios of Inventories to Output, by Major Manufacturing Industries,
Selected Years, 19.19—1948
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Ratio of Inventoriesa to Output
1919 1929 1937 1948
All manufacturing .184 .194 .196 .168
Food, beverages, and tobacco .128 .143 .149 .132
Textiles and textile products .187 .222 .241 .196
Leather and leather products .266 .265 .286 .198
Rubber and related products .113 .306 .279 .215
Lumber and wood products .248 .284 .216 .103
Paper, printing, etc. .099 .122 .130 .109
Chemicals and allied .288 .425 .434 .376
Stone, clay, and glass .221 .222 .214 .141
Metals and metal products .164 .193 .207 .196
Miscellaneous .995 .284 .287 .310
a Inventories are averages of end-of-year inventories of given year and preceding year.
Source: Inventories in 1929 prices: for 1919, 1929, and 1937, from Moses Abramovitz,
Inventories and Business Cycles, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, Table 108,
p. 564; for 1948, extrapolated from the 1937 estimate using the percentage change in in-
ventories in 1947 prices, estimated by Department of Commerce and taken from uripub-
lished worksheet.
The output figures are the ones developed for this study (see Appendix Table A- 10).
1948. The ratios of most of the 10 industry groups that can be dis-
tinguished for this computation trace the same pattern as the aggregate.
It follows from this that the decline in the working capital-output ratio
before 1948 must have been due to the increasingly efficient use of the
other components of working capital—cash, notes and accounts re-
ceivable, and other assets.
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TABLE 23
CapitalaOutput Ratios in Mining: Major Industries, Selected Years, 1870—1953
Ratios to Output 187018801890190919191929194019481953
All mining
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TABLE 23 (concluded)
Ratios to Output 187018801890190919191929194019481953























For definition of terms relating to capital see Chapter 2, p. 14.
Source: see notes to Appendix Tables B-7 to B-i 1.
Mining, 1870—1948
During the early decades, both the plant-output ratio and the
working capital-output ratio rose (Tables 23 and 24). In some of the
industries, the increase was steeper in the plant-output ratios and, in
the others, in the working capital-output ratios. These differences,
however, might be due to reporting errors or to errors introduced by
our estimates of the breakdown of total capital by type of asset for the
years for which no breakdown was reported. For aggregate mining, the
increase in the plant-output ratio appears to have been steeper than
that in the working capital-output ratio. Here, the impact of errors in
measurement is certainly smaller than in the case of the individual
industries. On the other hand, the significance of the difference is
reduced by the changes that occurred in the relative weights of the
individual industries.
In the following decades, 1919—1948, the statistical data are more
reliable, and the differences in the pattern of change in the ratio of
plant and of working capital to output can be seen more clearly. In
1Netvalue of structures and equipment.
74TABLE 24
CapitalaOutput Ratios in Mining: Minor Industries, Selected Years, 1870—1947
Ratios to Output: 1870188018901909191919401947
Iron
Based on 1929 prices:
Capital 0.71 1.22 1.53 2.21 1.95n.a.n.a.
Plant 0.470.830.85 1.58 1.41n.a.n.a.
Working capital 0.240.390.680.630.540.250.37
Based on reported values:
Total capital 1.35 1.982.242.742.30 1.36 1.03
Land 0.98 1.401.30 1.21 1.00n.a.na.








Based on reported values:




Working capital 0.080.140.180.57 1.340.780.57
Lead and zinc




Based on reported values:
Total capital 1.991.66 1.712.132.62 1.000.58
Land 1.090.910.93 1.02 1.47n.a.•n.a.




Based on 1929 prices:
Capital 2.553.155.415.443.35n.a.n.a.
Plant 2.483.085.134.442.72n.a.n.a.
Working capital 0.070.070,28 1.000.630.950.77
Based on reported values:
Total capital 1.893.055.22 5.714.802.263.09
Land 1.352.183.732.852.88n,a.n.a.
Capital 0.540.871,492.86 1.92n.a.na.
Plant 0.510.84 1.402.16 1.26n.a.n.a.
Working capital 0.030.030.090.700,660.460.68
Other metals
Based on reported values:
Total capital nc. n.c.n.c.n.c. 2.513.01 1.99
n.a. =notavailable.
n.c. =notcomparable.
For definition of terms relating to capital see Chapter II, p. 14.
Source: See notes to Appendix Tables B-i through B- 11.
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most industries, the ratios of working capital to output began to de-
cline much later than the ratios of plant to output and the decline
was much smaller. Thus, for aggregate mining, the ratio of working
capital to output, whether based on reported values or values in 1929
prices, increased until 1929. On the other hand, the ratio of plant to
output based on values in 1929 prices began to decline in 1919, and
much more markedly than did the ratio of working capital to output.
In the petroleum and natural gas industry, the ratio of working capital
to output, whether based on 1929 or on reported values, continued to
increase until 1929, while the plant-output ratio based on 1929 prices
began to decline in 1919. Very nearly the same pattern is found in the
metal mining industry: the decline in the working capital-output ratio
began in 1919; the plant-output ratio in reported values declined in
1909, the deflated ratio in 1890. In bituminous coal mining, the ratio
of working capital to output, based on 1929 prices, continued to in-
crease up to 1948, and that based on reported values, until 1929. How-
ever, the plant-output ratio based on 1929 prices rose only intil 1919.
For the other nonmetals group, the ratio of working capital to output
increased until 1940, but the ratio of plant to output began to decline
after 1909. Anthracite mining appears to be the only industry where
the reversal of trend in the plant- and working capital-output ratios
occurred at the same time and where both ratios show an equally
abrupt decline.
How can the difference in movement between the plant- and working
capital-output ratios be explained? High tax liabilities might have
been considered responsible for the slower decline in the working
capital-output ratio, especially since 1940.2 However, another factor,
whose importance is difficult to assess, has had the opposite effect, at
least on the working capital-output ratios based on reported values.
This is the wide application of last-in, first-out (LIFO) accounting
since 1940. (It was legalized in 1938.) This method has tended to
understate working capital, because the inventory account is evaluated
at the prices of inventory initially acquired or of inventory held when
LIFO was introduced. These prices have lagged substantially behind
current market values.
2 A survey (taken from Moody's) of the balance sheets as of December 1948 of
eighty large corporations engaged primarily in mining activities discloses a high
share of tax liabilities. Thus, the sum of the items "accrued taxes' •and"reserves
for taxes" (reported under current liabilities) accounted for 7 per cent of total lia-
bilities and 48 per cent of current liabilities. Using a1to 1ratio between tax
liabilities and tax funds, this sum would account for around 20 per cent of working
capital. (This figure is rather exaggerated, first, because tax liabilities are pre-
sumably lower in smaller corporations than in those studied and, second, because
there is no good reason to assume a 1 to 1 relationship between tax liabilities and
funds available for taxes.)
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At least two factors affect the behavior of the plant-output and work-
ing capital-output ratios differently in mining than in manufacturing.
First, the composition of working capital in the two sectors is different.
Cash is a substantially greater proportion of working capital in mining
than in manufacturing. (For example, in the great majority of mining
industries in 1948, cash was more than 40 per cent of total working
capital, compared with less than 20 per cent in all manufacturing.)
This may result in part from the relatively greater importance of
leased properties in mining than in manufacturing. This, in turn, en-
tails a greater need for cash to meet the payments for rentals and
royalties;
TABLE 25
Capital-Output Ratios in Mining: Working Capital and Components,
Major Industries, Selected Years, 1929—1948
(based on book values)
1929 1930b1940 1948
Metals:
Cash .14 .26 .19
Notes and accounts receivable A0 .13 .16
Inventories .36 .17 .13
Total working capitalc .60 .90 .56 .48
Anthracite coal:
Cash .04 .08 .08
Notes and accounts receivable .31 .11 .07
Inventories .04 .04 .04
Total working capitalc .37 .39 .23 .19
Bituminous coal:
Cash .08 .08 .10
Notes and accounts receivable .25 .15 .11
Inventories .05 .04 .04
Total working capitaic .34 .39 .27 .24
Petroleum and natural gas:
Cash .17 .17 .19
Notes and accounts receivable .56 .33 .16
Inventories .16 .08 .10
Total working capitale .79 .89 .59 .44
Other nonmetals:
Cash .11 .18 .12
Notes and accounts receivable .23 .17 .13
Inventories .19 .17 .08
Total working capitaic .47 .53 .52 .33
aPromTable 23.
b Underlying data adjusted for consolidated returns.
Because of rounding details may not add to total.
Source: StaLsiics of Income, Part 2, Bureau of Internal Revenue (now Internal Revenue
Service) related years.
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The ratio of cash to output has not only failed to decline but has
even increased inall mining industries during the last decades
(Table 25).
The second factor is the relatively higher ratio of depreciable and
depletable assets to output and the relatively greater retardation in
growth of output and capital in mining than in manufacturing. Other
conditions being equal, a declining rate of growth of capital means a
rising ratio of accumulated depreciation and depletion reserves to net
capital. Thus, "self-generating" liquidity becomes relatively more im-
portant the higher the total capital-output ratio, the greater the decline
in this ratio, or the greater the slackening of the rate of growth. For
this reason, the range of substitutability between fixed and working
capital via depreciation and depletion charges may have been par-
ticularly wide in the mining industries. The combination of these
factors may have reduced the incentive for more intensive use of work-
ing capital in mining. On the other hand, the greater retardation in
growth of the mining industries during the period also implies a
relatively higher increase in the ratio of replacements to the net value
of plant. In turn, plant efficiency should rise and, consequently, the
plant-output ratio should fall.
A declining rate of growth in an industry's capital formation co-
incident with a rising ratio of depreciation charges to capital (gross or
net) raises a different problem. Are not accounting practices responsible,
at least in part, for the observed decline in the plant-output ratio?
Assume that depreciation charges exceed the real functional deteriora-
tion (owing to age, obsolescence, and undermaintenance) of structures
and equipment. Then, in periods of sharp retardation in the rate of
growth of capital, would not the accumulated depreciation reserves
increasingly overstate and, therefore, net capital value increasingly
understate, the "true" operational value of the capital assets?
The premise of the preceding question is that depreciation charges
exceed the real functional deterioration of the capital units. There-
fore, a precise answer is not possible. Indeed, if one considers the
accelerated obsolescence of equipment, in recent decades, resulting
from rapid technological advances, as much ground exists for believing
that the prevailing rates are too low as for assuming that they are too
Our record begins with 1930, the first year of the Great. Depression, when the
cash-output ratios are certainly overstated. Nevertheless, the ratios have risen be-
tween 1930 and 1948. We have, unfortunately, no data by which to trace these
ratios in earlier years.
Note that the ratios of notes and accounts receivable to output dropped sharply
during 1930—1948. The decline was so substantial that, taken as a suni. the ratios of
cash and receivables to output also declined. The failure of the cash-output ratios
to decline could thus be partly explained by substitutions between cash and
receivables.
78RATIOS OF FIXED AXD WORKIJ'IG CAPITAL TO OUTPUT
high.' This aspect of functional deterioration is usually neglected when
the length of life assumed for estimating depreciation rates is com-
pared with the actual operational length of life of a capital asset.
Newer capital units are more efficient than the relatively older ones
bought for the same values in constant prices, and the newer units
should be more profitable to use than the older ones. One might argue
that the older equipment will be used at a rate corresponding to its
obsolescence, rather than to its operational capacity. How completely
this relationship is realized depends on the extent of the divisibility of
capital units, the necessity of coordinating a variety of machine opera-
tions, and the interest of the owner in amortizing the capital value of
the old equipment. For industry as a whole, older equipment is used
in proportion to its value adjusted for obsolescence, although its
operational value may be considerably higher, i.e., rapidly growing
plants have newer equipment and run nearer to operational capacity
than do older plants. The same is true within a single plant, although
the limiting conditions mentioned above would play a much greater
role.5
Total Capital-Outptst Ratios, by Industries
The ratios of capital to output bear closely on changes in the demand
for savings by the mining industries and serve to highlight techno-
logical and other changes. Such ratios, however, do not reflect the
actual amount of wealth per unit of output used in the mining
industries, because natural wealth, i.e., the mineral resources them-
selves, is not included. The discrepancy between the stock of repro-
ducible wealth ("past labor") used in production and the actual
amount of wealth used for the same purpose is unique in the mining
industries.6 The reason is that the nonreproducible assets—the mineral
resources—constitute a large share of the value of total capital used in
mining. Conversely, past labor constitutes only a small share of the
total value of those assets.
This unique characteristic of mineral lands makes it difficult to
analyze the movement of the land-output ratio and, hence, the total
'We are not considering here the accelerated depreciation of emergency defense
facilities in the war and postwar period. This development affects a short time span
only. Moreover, as stated in Appendix Table B-9, accelerated amortizationis
relatively unimportant in mining. At its peak in 1943, it amounted to only 5 per
cent of normal depreciation.
5 For a more extended discussion of some of these points, see Simon Kuznets'
"Comment" in Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 14 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1951, pp. 62—68).
6 To a lesser degree, the same situation exists in agriculture. There, however, the
share of past labor in the total value of land is much higher, so that the difference
between the value of past labor and the total value of land is neglected by certain
authors.
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capital-output ratio, in a manner similar to that for the other capital
aggregates. The ratios of land to output based on reported values are
subject to the restrictions imposed by the different valuation bases of
numerator and denominator. Moreover, neither for practical nor
conceptual reasons is an adjustment for the different valuation bases
warranted.7
The social-accounting approach is probably the most useful for the
purpose of this study. We assume that the value of mineral lands is
equal to the value of their reproduction costs (the input factors pro-
vided for their discovery and development). However, except for the
petroleum and natural gas industry, costs of discovery and develop-
ment per unit of output are low, and the estimation of such a series
does not seem to warrant the time and effort required. Therefore, the
ratio of total capital (which includes land) to output is given only for
reported values in Tables 23 and 24. These ratios increased during the
earlier decades and declined during the later in much the same way as
the ratios of capital (defined as plant and working capital only) to out-
put. However, the former ratios rose less and declined more than the
ratios of capital to output. The same is true, of course, to an even
larger extent, of the ratios of land to output.
In general, these findings are what we might expect. Buying of
mineral land to ensure supply for a growing market, an amount be-
yond that necessary merely to ensure production at current rates for a
reasonably long period of time, should have been more frequent before
1900, when land prices were low, than in the later years. Also, the
entrepreneur's early optimism about future developments would have
expressed itself, at the outset, in relatively high land evaluation. For
these reasons, the land-output ratios can be expected to begin at a
relatively higher level than the capital-output ratios. On the other
hand, the more pessimistic outlook during the time of slackened
growth should have affected land values seriously, because they were
not supported by the value of input of past labor. The market value
of land per unit of output and, consequently, the book value, should
have declined more than the value of capital.8
For conceptual difficulties, see Appendix B, section E.
8 The last consideration is not valid for the petroleum and natural gas industry.
The rate of growth of output in this industry was accelerating rather than de-
celerating in 1919—1929. Moreover, because the number of transfers in this industry
is high, one would expect high valuations of the book value of land (see p. 82).
Indeed,our figures indicate no significant decline in the ratio of book value of land
to output, except for 1948. The exception is probably entirely due to the postwar
inflation of prices for petroleum and natural gas. The land-output ratio for this
industry (Table 24) is low because the vast majority of oil lands are held under
lease and, therefore, do not appear in our land estimates. For an estimate of the
market value of oil leases at different benchmarks, see note g.
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The precise validity of the above considerations, however, is ob-
scured by several factors other than the difference in the valuation
bases of the numerator and denominator. First, the land figures do not
include the value of leased land. Changes in the form of land tenure
may have contributed to the observed differences in the movement of
the ratios. Unfortunately, after 1919, we have no data to use as a check
on such a possibility. The tendencies for the period before 1919, how-
ever, may be indicated by the following percentages (based on census
data) of the total number of acres operated that were held under lease:
1890 1902 1909 1919
Anthracite coal 49.8 n.a. 33.1 25.6
Bituminous coal 25.3 n.a. 30.1 29.9
Petroleum and natural gas 81.0 n.a. 94.6 90.4
Iron n.a. n.a. 68.4k n.a.
Copper n.a. 3.8 3.2 3.6
Lead and zinc n.a. n.a. 21.4 26.6
Precious metals n.a. 5.6 15.4 20.0
All other n.a. n.a. 16.5 27.1
a Percentage of value of total output that was mined from leased land. The correspond-
ing figure for 1880 was 33.0. Figures for 1880 for the other industry groups are not
available.
It appears that, except in anthracite mining, for which the reverse has
been true, there has been a tendency toward more extensive use of
leased land. It is doubtful, however, whether this tendency has been
strong enough to account for much of the change in the land-output
ratios over time.9
We are concerned with the book value of land primarily because of its im-
portance in determining the capital dimensions of a niining enterprise, e.g., its
asset structure as compared with its liability structure. No such importance can be
ascribed to the value of leases. Moreover, the only way to approximate the vaLue of
leases is to capitalize royalties. The value of royalties strictly depends upon the
value of output in a given year. Thus, the value of leases is directly related to the
output value. However, we have calculated lease values fortotal mining by
industries for those benchmark years prior to 1919 for which statistics could be
found, and for oil and gas for the whole period. The estimates for the latter
industry are of greater interest because of the magnitudes involved. In the following
table, we show the estimated market value of oil and natural gas leases, exclusive
of value added by drilling and equipping of wells.
Lease Value Average Life Discount
(billions of Reserves Rate
of dollars) (years) (per cent)
1890 $0.04 — —
1909 0.3 20 4.0
1919 1.1 15 4.5
1929 1.9 14 4.0
1940 2.0 15 3.5
1948 8.0 16 3.0
The figure for 1890 is given in Report on Mineral Industries in the United States:
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Second, the book value of land is much affected by the extent of
market turnover. As long as the mineral lands are not sold, their value
may be kept on the books at levels approximating their reproducible
costs, i.e., their cost of discovery and development. Thus, reported land
values represent a mixture of different valuation bases, not only with
respect to the time the transactions were made, but also with respect
to the methods of valuation. Since the market value of land exceeds by
far its development costs, the total of reported book values will depend,
to a large extent, on the number of transactions made during the
period preceding the year in which the reports were made. Transfers
of mineral wealth were more frequent in earlier than in recent years.
Hence, this factor should have worked for higher book values of land
in the earlier years.
As depletion deductions received wider recognition (the tendency
was strengthened by the inception of the corporation Income tax in
1909), land values in book values tended to decline. However, later
revenue acts counteracted this decline.
The Revenue Act of 1918 allowed depletion charges to be based on
the market value as of March 1, 1913. The Act of 1921 allowed a
further deduction, in determining taxable income from the operation
of oil and mining properties, based on the appreciation of value result-
ing from the fresh discovery of minerals. As ,a result of the balancing
of these two tendencies, book values of land in 1919 are comparable
with those in l909.'°
The picture for 1929 and after is different. Relatively high depletion
allowances continued, and were stepped up during the forties. How-
ever, upward revaluations of land became less frequent in 1925—1929;
in the thirties, downward revaluations were predominant. The com-
bination of these two developments is mainly responsible for the sharp
decline in the land-output ratio after 1929. We hope our method of
breaking down total capital into land and capital yields figures that
1890. For all other years, we used the current annuity value of royalties paid to the
owners of oil lands, assuming that the latter remain unchanged during the lifetime
of the mineral reserves. For the years 1909and1919, the amount paid for royalties
was reported in the Census of Mines and Quarries. For the later years, the land-
owners' share of petroleum output was assumed to be 12.5 per cent and that of
natural gas to be 10 per.cent. [See H. Foster Bain, "Subsoil Wealth," in Studies in
Income and Wealth, Volume Twelve (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950,
p. 266); it was also assumed that 90 per cent of petroleum and natural gas in these
years was produced from leaseholds.]
10See,for instance, data on the surplus arising from the revaluation of property
assets and on depletion and depreciation reserves in Investments and Profits of
Bituminous Coal Operators, submitted by David L. Wing and James E. Black to
the U.S. Coal Commission, and published in its Report of the U.S. Coal Corn-
mission, Part iv (1923), p. 2541.
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account fully for the shrinkage in the book value of lnd since 1929.11
Indeed, we have good reason to think that if any bias resulted, it is in
an understatement of these land values.
The Record in Manufacturing, from 1918 to 1953
Between the postwar business cycle peak of 1948 and the succeeding
peak of 1953, net fixed capital in manufacturing (measured in 1929
prices) increased by nearly one.fourth and total capital by slightly
more. These represent substantial growth rates. In these circumstances,
the movement of the capital-output ratios is of special interest.
As we noted at an early point, the total capital-output ratio (based
on 1929 prices) for all manufacturing decreased by 3.1 per cent be-
tween 1948 and 1953. This decline occurred in 12 of the 19 groups for
which we can compute the ratios to ouput of fixed and working
capital (Table 26). In only 1 group (chemicals) did the total capital.
output ratio exceed the 1937 ratio.
For all manufacturing, the fixed capital.output ratios decreased by
5 per cent between 1948 and 1953, and those for working capital de-
creased by 1 per cent. Perhaps of more significance is the predominant
direction and magnitude of movement of the ratios for individual
industry groups. In 15 of the 19 groups, the ratio of fixed capital to
output declined between 1948 and 1953. In 11 groups, the decline was
10 per cent or more (Table 27). On the other hand, of the 4 industry
groups with a rising ratio, the relative increase was nominal in paper
and allied products and modest in textile mill products. It was sub-
stantial in iron, steel and nonferrous metals (15 per cent), and in
chemicals and allied products (34 per cent),'2 both of which include
government-owned but privately operated plants. Three of these
industries (the exception is textile mill products) had a better-than-
average percentage expansion of fixed capital between 1948 and 1953.
On the other hand, 3 other industry groups, with an equally high
relative expansion of fixed capital, continued to have declining fixed
capital-output ratios.
Among the 15 industries with a declining ratio of fixed capital to
output, 6 operated with less capital (in 1929 prices) in 1953 than in
1948. Leather excepted, the smaller amount of capital in 1953 pro-
duced a larger volume of output than did the larger amount of capital
in 1948. In the other 9 industry groups, capital expanded, but pro-
duction increased at a still more rapid rate.
In summary, nearly three-fourths of the major industry groups,
11Fora description of our method, see Appendix B, note 33, and the notes to
Appendix Table B-Il.
12SeeTable 26, note a.
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TABLE 26
Major Manufacturing Industries: Ratios to Output of Selected Capital
Components, 1948 and 1953
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Ratio to Ouput of:
Total Capital Fixed Capital WorkingCapital
19481953 19481953 19481953
All manufacturing .609.590 .285.270° .324.320
Beverages .571.413 .268.123 .303.290
Food and kindred products .347.328 .164.134 .183.194
Tobacco products .569.658 .056039 .513.619
Textile-mill products .555.631 .237.249 .318.382
Apparel .338.342 .051.043 .287.299
Forest products .705.760 .394.383 .311.377
Paper and allied products .764.753 .471.472 .293.281
Printing and publishing .690.669 .305.303 .385.366
Chemicals and allied products .716.840 .365.488a .'5 1.352
Petroleum and coal products .893.763 .576.483 .317.280
Rubber products .518.510 .175.144 .343.366
Leather and leather products .407.414 .093.076 .314.338
Stone, clay, and glass products .738.686 .401.354 .337.332
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals
and products .695.721 .363.4l6a .332.305
Machinery excluding electrical .712.657 .250.228 .462.429
Electrical machinery .583.527 .186.139 .397.388
Transportation equipment exclud-
ing motor vehicles .967.666 .382.247a .585.419
Motor vehicles and equipment .493.425 .209.185 .284.240
Miscellaneousb .609.577 .223.170 .386.407
a Except for the management fee, privately operated, government-owned facilities are
excluded from the 1953 output estimates, but they are included in the capital estimates.
A more realistic ratio, therefore, is obtained by excluding such facilities from fixed capital.
With this exclusion from industries where this item is quantitiatively important, the fixed
capital-output ratios are:
All groups .250
Chemicals and allied products .371
Iron and steel and nonferrous metals .367
Transportation equipment except motor vehicles.107
Comparable absolute changes would appear in the total capital-output ratios.
bIncludesinstruments and miscellaneous industries; ordnance included with iron,
steel, and nonferrous metals and products in both years.
Source: Based on Appendix Table A-iS and worksheets.
owning almost 60 per cent of all fixed capital (in 1929 prices) devoted
to manufacturing in 1953, continue to operate with fixed capital of
increasing efficiency. This suggests that the downward movement of
the fixed capital-output ratio initiated after World War I had not yet
spent itself, at least through 1953.
84RATIOS OF FIXED AND WORKING CAPITAL TO OUTPUT
Beween 1948 and 1953, the ratio of working capital to output for all
manufacturing declined in 10 of the 19 industry groups. The working
capital in these 10 groups also equaled 60 per cent of all working
capital used in manufacturing. However, since the decline occurred
only in a bare niajority of the industry groups, this indicates a de-
parture from the previous pattern of decline in the working capital-
TABLE 27
Major Manufacturing Industries: Fixed Capital and Selected Capital-
Output Ratios, Per Cent Change between 1948 and 1953




8 and 1953 in—
Ratio to Output of—
Fixed Fixed Working
Capital Capital Capital
All manufacturing + 23.4 —5.3 —1.2
Beverages —0.8 —54.1 —4.3
Food and kindred products —3.5 —18.3 +6.0
Tobacco products —23.5 —30.4 + 20.7
Textile-mill products — 1.6 + 5.1 + 20.1
Apparel +9.9 — 15.7 +4.2
Forest Products —0.1 —2.8 +21.2
Paper and allied products +26.1 +0.2 —4.1
Printing and publishing +4.0 —0.7 —4.9
Chemicals and allied products + 69.7 + 33.7 +0.3
Petroleum and coal products +8.5 —16.1 —11.7
Rubber products —2.9 — 17.7 +6.7
Leather and leather products — 18.8 — 18.3 + 7.6
Stone, clay, and glass products + 16.6 — 11.7 —1.5
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals and products + 38.1 ÷ 14.6 —8.1
Machinery excluding electrical + 17.6 —8.8 —6.7
Electrical machinery + 32.2 —25.3 —2.3
Transportation equipment excluding motor
vehicles +86.9 —35.3 —28.4
Motor vehicles and equipment + 37.1 — 11.5 —15.5
Miscellaneous + 14.2 —23.8 +5.4
Source: See Appendix Table A-15.
output ratio that characterized most branches of manufacturing. And
this deserves further exploration.
In Table 28, each major component of working capital—cash, notes
and accounts receivable, and inventories—is related to output (all in
1929 prices) for 1948 and 1953. Each component of working capital is
an average of year-end book values in the given and preceding year.
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In aggregate manufacturing, the ratio of cash to output declined by
13 per cent between 1948 and 1953, the inventory-output ratio in-
creased by 3 per cent, and the ratio of notes and accounts receivable
to output rose substantially (13 per cent). It was the rise in the latter
TABLE 28
Major Manufacturing Industries: Ratios of Selected Short-Term Assets
to Output, 1948 and 1953
(based on values in 1929 prices)




All manufacturinga .061.053 .085.096 .148.153
Beverages .052.047 .066.064 .173.165
Food and kindred products .032.032 .044.051 .090.095









Forest products .058.062 .087.114 .146.178
Paper and allied products .063.069 .078.082 .124.120
Printing .082.081 .122.121 .083.083
Chemical and allied products .076.074 .090.101 .156.163
Petroleum and coal .061.055 .106.108 .101.101
Rubber products .055.047 .111.140 .170.170
Leather and products .051.048 .093.114 .158.175
Stone, clay, and glass .073.072 .095.098 .129.127
Iron, steel, and nonferrous metals.066.060 .078.080 .138.150
Machinery excluding electrical .074.068 .109.123 .223.222
Electrical machinery .073.046 .127.128 .220.197
Transportation excluding motor
vehiclesa .122.047 .204.145 .366.208
Motor vehicles and equipment .069.040 .056.072 .138.118
Miscellaneous .066.055 .111.129 .194.195
a Shipbuilding excluded from numerator and denominator in all 1946 ratios but in-
cluded in all 1953 ratios.
Source: Based on Statistics of Income,Part2, Bureau of Internal Revenue (now Internal
Revenue Service), for 1948 and 1953. For conversion to 1929 prices, see Appendix A,
section B, part IC.
two components that restricted the decline in the, capital-output ratio
to slightly more than 1 per cent. However, the inventories-output ratio
rose in only 7 of the 19 industries; in 3 industries, this ratio was un-
changed. On the other hand, the receivables-output ratio rose in all
except 4 of the industry groups.
The inventory-output ratio in 1948 probably was unduly low owing
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to the shortages of the immediate postwar years.13 Probably the same
set of circumstances also depressed the 1948 ratio of notes and accounts
receivable to output. That is, in a strong sellers' market, manufacturers
had less need to finance their customers. With the subsequent rapid
expansion of capital stock and capacity, there was a gradual shift from
the sellers' market to one in which the buyer was no longer at a dis-
advantage. To expand sales in this situation, manufacturers financed
a larger proportion of their sales.14
These special circumstances of 1948 suggest that the rise in the
working capital-output ratio between 1948 and 1953 may well prove to
be a temporary interruption to the downward trend, rather than a
trend reversal. This determination must wait upon data for years
following 1953.
The Record in Mining, 1948—1953
The downward trend in the capital-output ratio (in 1929 prices) for
total mining has continued to 1953 (Table 29). The ratio in the latter
TABLE 29
Selected Capital-Output Ratios, by Major Mining Industries, 1948 and 1953
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Ratios to Output of—
Cap ital Plant WorkingCapital
19481953 19481953 19481953































Source: Based on data in Appendix Tables B-8 and B-Il, and worksheets.
13 The inventories.output ratio in 1948 was 14 per cent below that of 1937
(Table 22). The ratio for 1953 is 3.4 per cent higher than the 1948 ratio, making
for a lower ratio in 1953 than in1937. The ratios for 1948 differ because of
differences in the method of expressing inventories in 1929 prices. The method used
in preparing Table 22 is the preferred one. Data for this method were not readily
at hand for 1953.
"The four industries with declining ratios of notes and accounts receivable to
output serve to confirm this generalization. In two (beverages, and tobacco manu-
facturing) fixed capital declined; in printing and publishing, fixed capital rose a
modest 4 per cent. In the fourth industry, transportation equipment except motor
vehicles, military airplanes were the principal component to rise rapidly during this
period of the Korean War. Since the Federal government was the buyer, the
manufacturers had no pressing need to finance their sales with book credit.
87CAPITAL AND OUTPUT TRENDS
year was 6 per cent below the ratio for 1948. If the numerator of the
ratio is restricted to plant (structures and equipment) the decline is
even larger, nearly 9 per cent. On the other hand, the ratio of working
capital to output was unchanged in 1948 and 1953. On closer inspec-
tion, it appears that the continued decline of the ratio for all mining
is due to developments in the petroleum and natural gas industry
which, in 1953, used 68 per cent of all capital (in 1929 prices) devoted
to mining. In the other 4 major mining groups, all ratios (capital,
plant, and working capital to output) were higher in 1953 than in
1948. Indeed, the 1953 ratios for metals, anthracite, and bituminous
coal even exceeded the 1940 ratios; but, except in bituminous coal, the
1953 ratios were less than the 1929 ratios. The conclusion seems in-
escapable: the downward trend in the capital-output ratios in mining
(except in the petroleum and natural gas industry), evident since 1909
or 1919, reversed in the five-year period 1948—1953. In manufacturing,
the evidence of any reversal of trend, except for working capital, was
much less definitive.15
Changes between 1953 and 1957 in Capital-Output Ratios
for Manufacturing
Since the preparation of this manuscript, preliminary estimates of
capital for 1957 (another peak year in business activity) were prepared
by major manufacturing industry groups for the National Industrial
Conference Board.'6 These can be used to extend the estimates that
form the core of Part I of this monograph and, thereby, to provide a
view of developments in this area over the first post-World War II
decade.
The fixed-capital estimates based on data from Statistics of income
were prepared for 1956 and extended to 1957 using a sample (the
Quarterly Financial Report, United States Manufacturing Corpora-
tions) taken by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The 1957 estimate, therefore, is probably less
firmly based than are the estimates for 1948 and 1953. At best, it must
be considered preliminary.
Another caution relates to the change, after 1953, in the depreciation
regulations for acquisitions of depreciable assets. They introduce an
15 The reversal in trend of the capital-output ratios provides an unusual oppor-
tunity to analyze the changes in technology and other factors that made first for a
declining ratio of capital to output and then for a rising ratio. This would require
a series of detailed industry case studies that cannot be undertaken forthis
monograph.
16 For a description of the estimates,see Daniel Creamer, Technical Paper,
National Industrial Conference Board (forthcoming).
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element of incomparability into the balance-sheet data because the
new regulations permit a faster recovery of new investment than was
possible under the straight-line depreciation previously prescribed.
Thus, estimates of net fixed capital derived from book values would
be relatively more net of depreciation after 1953 than in 1953 and
earlier years. The elimination of this element of incomparability
raised the 1956 estimate of net fixed assets for all manufactures in 1929
prices by 1.6 per cent and, therefore, the fixed capital-output ratio by
the same amount.17 This adjustment could not be made by industry
subgroups. Departure from the average adjustment of all subgroups
would depend on the rate of expansion of fixed-capital assets since
1953 and on the portion subject to accelerated amortization as an
emergency facility. We fall back on an arbitrary arrangement: We
treat a decline in the fixed capital-output ratio of 2 per cent or less
between 1953 and 1957 as equivalent to no change.18
Although fixed capital in manufacturing expanded at an average
annual rate of 4.3 per cent between 1948 and 1953—perhaps the
highest rate since World War I—it achieved a still higher rate, 4.7,
over the 1953—1957 business cycle (Table 30). In the former period,
9 of the 21 industry groups had average or better.than-average rates of
growth. With the exception of chemicals and allied products, and
paper and allied products, all these industries were engaged in the
manufacture of consumers' and producers' metal products. These,
apparently, were the industries in which technical innovations and
the long suppression of demand created the strongest pressures for
expansion. These, then, were the industries that would outbid all
others for the limited resources available for expansion. In the next
cycle, although the urgency for expansion was less, these industries
continued to grow at a relatively high rate. That is; in 6 of the 9
groups, the average annual rate of increase was less in the 1953—1957
cycle than in the preceding cycle; but, also in 6 groups, the rate
equaled or exceeded the annual growth rate for all manufacturing.
Half of the 12 industry groups with less than the average rate of
growth between 1948 and 1953 actually sustained a contraction in
fixed capital measured in constant prices. In each case, however, the
contraction was either nominal or of modest proportions. In the next
period, 9 of the 12 had a higher rate of expansion (or a lower rate of
contraction), and 5 groups actually expanded at a higher annual rate
than allmanufacturing. Once the chemical and metal working
17 This adjustment will be described in Creamer, op. cit.
18 Estimates for both 1957 and 1953 include fixed capital owned by government
but operated by private industry. The output estimate is the annual rate of output
of the peak quarterly output in 1957, as indicated by the Federal Reserve Board's
index of manufacturing production.
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TABLE 30
Change in Fixed Capital and in Its Ratio to Output, by Major Manufacturing
Industries, 1948—1953 and 1953—1957
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Rate of Change per year
in Fixed Capital




All manufacturing +4.3 +4.7 —5.3 +8.1
Miscellaneous including ordnance+18.5 +0.3 + 71.5 —11.8
Transportation equipment cx-
cludingautos +13.3 +5.9 —35.3 +13.4
Chemicals and allied products + 11.2 + 7.9 + 33.7 + 5.3
Instruments and professional
apparatus + 10.4 +7.6 —17.8 + 12.1
Motor vehicles +6.5 +8.6 —11.5 +48.1
Electrical machinery +5.8 +3.7 —25.3 + 18.7
Paper and allied products +4.8 +6.6 +0.2 +5.9
Fabricated metal products +4.3 +3.6 —7.7 +5.4
Primary metals +4.3 +4.7 + 10.4 + 19.6
Machinery other than electrical +3.3 +5.5 —8.8 + 12.3
Stone, clay, and glass products +3.1 +8.7 —11.7 + 26.0
Apparel +1.9 0.0 —15.7 —7.0
Petroleum and coal products + 1.7 +7.0 —16.1 +2.3
Printing and publishing +0.8 +3.7 —0.7 —5.0
Lumber and products +0.6 +6.9 —4.0 + 16.0
Textile-mill products —0.3 —1.8 +5.1 —16.1
Rubber products —0.6 + 3.7 — 17.7 + 5.6
Food and kindred productsa —0.6 —0.8 —27.2 —6.9
Furniture and fixtures —2.4 +2.7 — 10.7 —6.7
Leather and leather products —4.1 —1.5 — 18.3 —21.1
Tobacco products —5.2 + 7.2 —30.4 + 35.9
a Includes beverages.
Note: The industry groups are arranged by order of the rate of change between 1948
and 1953, starting with the highest.
Source: Daniel Creamer, Technical Paper, National Industrial Conference Board (forth-
coming).
industries had satisfied their more pressing needs for capital, other
branches of manufacturing were able to grow at a faster rate.
We have already noted that in most branches (16 out of 21), the
fixed capital-output ratio declined between 1948 and 1953, thus con-
tinuing the general pattern that had persisted since about 1919. Over
the course of the 1953—1957 cycle, the continuance of the relatively
high rates of expansion caused the stock of fixed capital to grow more
rapidly than output, resulting in a significant rise in the fixed capital-
output ratio. This occurred in two-thirds of the 21 industry groups.
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With one exception, the rise in the ratio amounted, to 5 per cent or
more and to 10 per cent or more in 9 industries. Thus, for the first
time in about four decades, manufacturing industries typically used
more fixed capital in constant prices, not less, to produce a unit of
output. This was the predominant trend from 1880 to 1919. Perhaps
it is no coincidence that the condition reappeared in 1957, when the
annual rate of capital expansion was approaching that of some of these
earlier decades. The latter supposition is consistent with the low rates
of growth of the 7 industries with declining fixed capital.output ratios
between 1953 and 1957. Five of these industries had either stood still
or declined, and the remaining 2 rose less than 4 per cent.
The ratio of working capital to output in 1956 (the last year for
which the computation can be made) was 5 per cent above the ratio
for 1953 and 3.7 per cent above the 1948 ratio. The reversal in the
direction of the trend initiated in half of the industry groups in the
1948—1953 period became more pervasive, having occurred in all but
5 of the 22 subgroups. Once again, to judge by a limited examination
of the evidence, the need to hold an ever larger volume of accounts
and notes receivable per unit of output has been mainly responsible
for the rising ratio of working capital to output. Thus, to utilize the
rapidly expanded capacity, producers have been obliged to finance an
increasing proportion of their sales.
Summary of Findings
1. For manufacturing, the subdivision between fixed and working
capital can be made for seven benchmark years beginning 1890. The
ratios of both fixed and working capital to output, have risen up to
1919 or, at the latest, 1929. Both ratios declined thereafter up to 1948.
The rise from 1890 to 1929 was somewhat sharper for the working
capital.output ratio than for the fixed capital-output ratio (23 and
19 per cent, respectively). The decline from 1929 to 1948 was greater
for the fixed capital.output ratio than for the working capital.output
ratio (34 and 29 per cent, respectively). This is conclusive evidence
that the changes in the total capital.output ratio were not caused by
any change in the relative importance of fixed and working capital.
2. In mining industries, also, during the earlier decades, the ratios
of plant (net value of structures and equipment) to output and of
working capital to output rose. The increase in the former was steeper.
Between 1919 and 1948, in most mining industries, the ratios of work-
ing capital to output began to decline later (1929 rather than 1919)
than the ratios of plant to output, and the decline was much smaller.
3. The discrepancy between the stock of reproducible wealth ("past
labor") used in production and the actual amount of wealth used for
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the same purpose is unique for mining industries in that nonrepro-
ducible assets—the mineral resources—constitute a large share of the
value of total capital used in mining. Conversely, past labor constitutes
only a small share of the total value of these assets. Because of con-
ceptual difficulties, the ratio of total capital (which includes land) to
output is given only for reported values. These ratios increased during
the earlier decades and declined during the later ones in much the
same way as the ratios of capital (defined as plant and working capital
only) to output. The rise in the former ratios, however, was less pro-
nounced and the decline more marked than in the ratios of capital to
output. The same is true, of course, to an even larger extent, of the
ratios of land to output.
4. After 1948, nearly three-fourths of the major industry groups,
owning almost 60 per cent of all fixed capital (in 1929 prices) devoted
to manufacturing in 1953, continued to operate with fixed capital of
increasing efficiency. That is, the fixed capital-output ratio continued
to decline despite the relatively rapid rate of annual expansion in
fixed capital between 1948 and 1953. The working capital-output ratio
also declined for all manufacturing and for about half of the 19
industry groups. This nonconformity of nearly half of the industry
groups represents a departure from the pattern that had persisted since
about the end of World War I.
5. The downward trend in the capital-output ratio in mining,
evident since 1919, was reversed in 1948—1953, except in the petroleum
and natural gas industries. This was true for mining industries that
expanded their capital (in 1929 prices), such as metals and other non-
metals, as well as for those that contracted their capital stock, such as
anthracite, or maintained a constant stock, such as bituminous coal.
6. The continuance in the 1953—1957 cycle of the relatively high
growth rates initiated in the 1948—1953 business cycle caused the stock
of fixed capital to increase more rapidly than output, resulting in a
significant rise in the fixed capital-output ratio. This occurred in two-
thirds of the 21 industry groups. Thus, for the first time in about four
decades, manufacturing industries typically used more fixed capital in
constant prices, not less, to produce a unit of output. The working
capital-output ratio also increased in this period (by 5 per cent) and
this increase occurred in all except 5 of the industry groups.
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